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INTRODUCTION
United States patent law and policy embrace an expansive
scope for patent eligible subject matter in order to effectuate the
Constitutional mandate “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”1 Supreme Court
precedent clearly articulates the minimal restraints on patent
eligible subject matter: only inventors who seek to claim a natural
law, natural phenomenon, abstract idea, or mental process should
be barred at the threshold of the United States patent examination
system.2 These minimal restraints, collectively referred to herein
as the “Fundamental Principles Exception,” reflect the balance
between policies of liberally encouraging innovation while
preserving fundamental concepts, principles, and ideas for free and
unfettered use by all.3
Even a patent claim that recites a fundamental principle may be
patent eligible so long as the claim as a whole is not drawn solely
to the principle.4 The operative question under the Fundamental
Principles Exception is whether the claim defines an application of
the principle with sufficient particularity so as not to preempt all
uses and implementations of the principle.5 If so, then the claim
recites patent eligible subject matter and is not excludable under

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972).
3
When addressing the question of patent eligible subject matter, it is crucial to
understand and remember that a determination of patent eligibility is made at the very
beginning of the patent examination procedure and is analytically distinct from the
rigorous statutory requirements of patentability. While a patent may easily satisfy the
eligibility test—it is meant to be a low bar for access to the system—it must still satisfy
the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, etc., before a patent eligible
claim is determined to be a patentable claim. Patent eligibility must not be confused with
patentability.
4
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
5
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 203; see also Parker, 437 U.S. at 599; Gottschalk, 409 U.S.
at 71; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
2
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the Fundamental Principles Exception. In In re Bilski,6 the Federal
Circuit disparaged this inquiry as “hardly straightforward” and
articulated the proxy “machine-or-transformation” test as the sole
and definitive test to determine patent eligibility of process
claims.7 Under that test, the operative questions are whether the
claimed process is tied to a particular machine or apparatus or
whether it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.8 In either case, the particular machine or transformation also
must “impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope” and must
not involve “insignificant extra-solution activity” or “mere datagathering” to “impart patent eligibility.”9
While the Federal Circuit’s Bilski decision restricts business
method patents, there is apprehension in the intellectual property
community that the machine-or-transformation test will unfairly
limit patents in the life sciences, particularly claims directed to
diagnostic and screening methods.10 Having taken up Bilski on
certiorari, the Supreme Court is poised to settle the question
whether the machine-or-transformation test is the exclusive,
mandatory test for patent eligibility of processes under 35 U.S.C. §
101. In our view, the Court should answer the question in the
negative and reemphasize the Fundamental Principles Exception as
the governing test because it is, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s
characterization, straightforward and more likely to lead to a sound
result than the highly subjective and complicated machine-or6

545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129
S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776
(Nov. 9, 2009).
7
Id. at 954.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 961–62.
10
See Christopher Holman, Bilski: Assessing the Impact of a Newly Invigorated Patent
Eligibility Doctrine on the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Future of Personalized
Medicine, CURRENT TOPICS MED. CHEMISTRY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424493; Matthew Ward & Jack Redfern, US Patent Law: No
Longer Concrete, Tangible and Useful, MONDAQ, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.mondaq.
com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=77112. See generally Michael R. Samardzija,
Recent Patent Rulings Can Impede the Progress of Personalized Medicine: The Bilski
and Classen Decisions Can Render Numerous in Vitro Diagnostic Claims Unpatentable,
BIOPHARM INT’L, Aug. 2009, at 2, 2, available at http://biopharminternational.find
pharma.com/biopharm/Business+Articles/Recent-Patent-Rulings-Can-Impede-theProgress-of-P/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/615147.
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transformation test. The Fundamental Principles Exception is a
broader, more flexible test to determine the threshold question of
patent eligibility, which is consistent with well-settled law and
public policy. In Part I of this article, we briefly survey the law
and policy that supports a broad, flexible test to determine patent
eligibility. In Part II, starting with the important Laboratory Corp.
of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
(“LabCorp”)11 case, we analyze patent eligibility of personalized
medicine patent claims at issue in recent cases and contrast the
limitations of the machine-or-transformation test against the
simpler, more flexible approach of the Fundamental Principles
Exception. We conclude that while the machine-or-transformation
test may be a useful way to assess certain types of inventions, it
should not be the mandatory, exclusive test for determining patent
eligibility of process patents.
I. THE LAW AND POLICY SUPPORTING A BROAD, FLEXIBLE TEST
FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY
As Judge Rader so aptly noted in his dissent in Bilski, one of
our founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, articulated the policy
underpinning the Patent Copyright Clause12 of the Constitution:
“Nobody wishes more than I do ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.”13 Mr. Jefferson recognized the importance of
commercial incentives attendant patent exclusivity as a sharp spur
to innovation and progress in the sciences and useful arts. The
liberal encouragement of ingenuity and innovation intended to be
fostered by the grant of exclusive patent rights was reflected in the
11

548 U.S. 124 (2006).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13
5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed. 1871); see also Bilski,
545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The Patent Law of the United States has always
embodied the philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.’”
(quoting WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 75–76)). Mr. Jefferson also
recognized the danger of overprotection of patent rights, noting the difficulty of
“‘drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent, and those which are not.’” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9
(1966) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813),
reprinted in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb &
Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905)).
12
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almost boundless language of the Constitution that provides for the
time-limited, exclusive right of inventors to their “Discoveries.”14
In the case of patent eligibility for process or method claims, the
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is broad and clear: “any new and
useful process” or “any new and useful improvement thereof” is
patent eligible.15 Therefore, any new process that has practical
utility and is not excludable under the Fundamental Principles
Exception is patent eligible and entitled to examination for
compliance with patentability requirements.
In Diamond v. Diehr,16 the Supreme Court articulated that a
process claim which includes a fundamental principle is patent
eligible as long as the process as a whole represents “an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula.”17 In
Diehr, the invention under consideration was a physical and
chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products,
where the claimed process steps included the use of a mathematical
formula.18 The Court cautioned against reading limitations into the
patent laws not expressed by the legislature19 and went on to
clarify that in a case where an inventor discovered a previously
unknown natural law or phenomenon (more recently exemplified
in the diagnostic method claimed in the LabCorp20 case): “‘[i]f
there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from
the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.’”21
14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. While discoveries arguably include natural laws and
phenomena, it always has been understood that patent eligible discoveries include
“anything under the sun that is made by man.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Citing a long line
of precedent, the Court noted that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas have been held not patentable.” Id. Even though the dividing line between patent
eligible inventions and ineligible fundamental principles is, of course, sometimes quite
difficult to draw, the Supreme Court consistently has adhered to that broad flexible
standard and refused to restrict patent eligibility by imposing a more limited, rigid test.
15
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
16
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
17
Id. at 187.
18
Id. at 177.
19
Id. at 182.
20
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006).
21
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 n.11 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
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The Court distinguished a claim that, as a whole, would preempt
all uses of a mathematical formula—a patent ineligible abstract
idea—from the claim at issue in Diehr, which applied a
mathematical formula for a particular use:
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula
implements or applies that formula in a structure or
process which, when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing
an article to a different state or thing), then the
claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.22
The takeaway, in short, is that a process or method claim is
patent eligible if, when considered as a whole, it defines an
application of a fundamental principle with sufficient particularity
so as not to preempt all uses and implementations of the principle.
The policies of promoting the progress of science and useful
technologies, liberally encouraging innovation and ingenuity,
maintaining a strong patent system, and helping to sustain
emerging industries and long-term job growth all support wellsettled Supreme Court precedent articulating process patent
eligibility requirements. A broad, flexible test, as embodied in the
Fundamental Principles Exception, encourages inventors and
investors alike to commit significant human and financial capital to
research and development efforts in many different fields. This is
particularly true in the emerging fields of medical and genetic
diagnostics. Although estimates vary widely, it can cost hundreds
of millions of dollars and take more than ten years to develop a
22

Id. at 192. As noted in Judge Newman’s dissent in Bilski, the use of the exemplary
“e.g.” in the parenthetical contradicts the majority’s determination that “machine-ortransformation” is the definitive, mandatory test for assessing patent eligibility. In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert.
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009); see also Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978) (“The statutory definition of ‘process’ is broad. An argument
can be made, however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the
statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ As in Benson, we assume that a valid process
patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these qualifications of our earlier
precedents.” (internal citations omitted)).
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successful biologic drug or genetic screening test.23 Broad access
to the patent system, to the fullest extent permitted under the
Constitution and without limitations that have not been expressed
by Congress, is crucial to the support of these emerging
technologies.
II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS AND OTHER
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE INVENTIONS
A. The LabCorp Case
Accurate and early diagnosis of cobalamin (Vitamin B12) and
folate deficiencies in humans is important because these vitamin
deficiencies can lead to serious, potentially life-threatening, blood
and neuropsychiatric disorders.24 The university researchers who
obtained and enforced the diagnostic method claims at issue in
LabCorp, were conducting research to develop an improved assay
(test) for cobalamin and folate deficiencies.25 The inventors
discovered that there were abnormally high homocysteine26 levels
in the blood of patients who suffered from cobalamin and/or folate
deficiencies, a specific biochemical correlation that was previously
unknown.27 The inventors used this discovery to develop a new
and better test for diagnosing cobalamin and folate deficiencies.28
The inventors’ patent contains several different method claims
that cover new methods for conducting the homocysteine assay
itself, for example by using a labeled reference standard and mass
spectrometer in a process to determine homocysteine levels (claims

23

See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Genetic Research Spurs Fight over Patents Tied to the
Body, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2009, at A21.
24
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col. 1 ll. 32–40 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10,
1990).
25
See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125–28.
26
Homocysteine is a particular species of amino acid known as a “sulfhydryl amino
acid.” Pål I. Holm et al., Modulation of the Homocysteine-Betaine Relationship by
Methylenetetrahydrofolate Reductase 677 C->T Genotypes and B-Vitamin Status in a
Large-Scale Epidemiological Study, 92 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM
1535, 1535 (2007).
27
See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 128.
28
Id.

C02_MURPHY_FINAL_051910 (DO NOT DELETE)

762

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/19/2010 12:01 PM

[Vol. 20:755

1 and 7).29 The patent eligibility of these method claims for
determining homocysteine levels was not challenged because they
represent a classic, practical application—improving the process of
measuring homocysteine—derived from the newly discovered
naturally occurring correlation between elevated homocysteine
levels and cobalamin or folate deficiencies.30 The patent also
includes a series of diagnostic claims for a method of detecting a
cobalamin or folate deficiency.31 Independent claim 1332 reads as
follows: “[a] method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or
folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying
a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.”33
A medical diagnostic process claim of this type is characterized
by a data determination step, which identifies or measures a
biological or chemical marker, followed by a mental step of a
physician or medical practitioner who utilizes the information
obtained in the first step to infer or recognize the newly discovered
phenomenon and diagnose the patient.34 Though admittedly broad,
claim 13 may well define a patent eligible process when assessed
under the Fundamental Principles Exception, notwithstanding
Justice Breyer’s conclusion to the contrary.35 A close examination,
29

Id.; ’658 Patent col. 41 ll. 2–19, 34–35.
Id.; see also John A. O’Brien, Bilski v. Doll—Is the Federal Circuit’s “Machine or
Transformation” Test the Only Test for § 101 Subject Matter?, 977 PLI/Pat 437, 447
(2009).
31
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 129.
32
We note that the petition for certiorari in LabCorp was dismissed as improvidently
granted because LabCorp had failed to raise the § 101 challenge to claim 13 below. See
id. at 125–26.
33
’658 Patent col. 41 ll. 58–65 (emphasis added).
34
This type of diagnostic method has been coined a “determine-and-infer” claim. See
Kevin E. Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibility,
PATENTLY-O, Sept. 17, 2009, at 2, http://www.patentlyo.com/collins.intangibility.pdf.
Determine-and-infer claims provide powerful commercial incentives for innovation
because they broadly convey exclusive rights to new, useful, and nonobvious processes
involving recognition of previously unknown biochemical or genetic correlations,
metabolic pathways or similar natural phenomena that are highly useful for diagnosing,
treating and preventing disease. See id. at 5–8. These are precisely the kind of incentives
that drive capital-intensive innovation in emerging technologies. See id.
35
See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 134–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30
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however, does reveal the potential for confusion and inconsistent
results that may arise depending on the analytical test used to
assess patent eligibility.
1. Well-Settled Fundamental Principles Analysis
Applying the Fundamental Principles Exception to LabCorp
claim 13, the pertinent question is: does the claim as a whole
define an application of the correlation between elevated
homocysteine and deficient cobalamin/folate with sufficient
particularity so as not to preempt substantially all uses and
implementations of the correlation?
Using this analytical test, the patent eligibility of claim 13
becomes clearer. As so aptly noted by Judge Rader in his Bilski
dissent:
The fundamental error in that Lab. Corp. dissent is
its failure to recognize the difference between a
patent ineligible relationship—i.e., that between
high homocysteine levels and folate and cobalamin
deficiencies—and a patent eligible process for
applying that relationship to achieve a useful,
tangible, and concrete result—i.e., diagnosis of
potentially fatal conditions in patients.
....
. . . [T]he invention does not attempt to claim
that natural phenomenon. Instead the patent claims
a process for assaying a patient’s blood and then
analyzing the results with a new process that detects
the life-threatening condition.36
Claim 13 recites a practical application of the identified
correlation in the claim preamble—“detecting a deficiency of
cobalamin or folate”37—and thereby does not preempt all
implementations and uses of the newly discovered correlation.
While it would be better claim drafting practice to recite the
36

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting),
cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
37
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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diagnostic level or range for the “elevated” homocysteine level in a
wherein clause in the body of the claim, as in Prometheus
Laboratory, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,38 this should not
detract from the patent eligibility of the subject matter. Taken as a
whole, claim 13 defines a specific application of the discovered
correlation—it requires measuring total homocysteine levels to
make a specific diagnostic correlation between elevated
homocysteine levels and deficient cobalamin or folate levels.39
The claimed method does not foreclose all uses and
implementations of the correlation such as, for example, using it to
discover and develop improved treatment methods for cobalamin
and folate deficiencies or improved methods for measuring other
biological or chemical markers that correspond to cobalamin or
folate deficiencies. In our view, claim 13 properly capitalizes on
the newly discovered correlation by specific, practical application
of the correlation to achieve a useful diagnostic process.
Accurate diagnosis is the touchstone for deciding on any
treatment regimen in the medical profession, where the guiding
principle is: “First, do no harm.”40 The availability of incentives to
encourage inventors to innovate and make diagnostic advances in
the medical arts would be severely undercut if the entire class of
these method claims were deemed patent ineligible. If there is
concern that physicians and other medical practitioners would be
liable for infringement of such claims, there is already precedent
for Congress to step in and protect them.41 Title 35 U.S.C. §
287(c) exempts medical practitioners from patent infringement
under § 271(a) and (b) (direct and inducement, but not
contributory, infringement) for the performance of a certain
defined “medical activity” that would otherwise constitute an
38
581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 20 ll. 38–
39 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (issued Mar. 12, 2002).
39
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col. 41 ll. 58–65 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10,
1990).
40
This mantra is often ascribed to Hippocrates as part of the Hippocratic Oath,
however, it is actually derived from a Latin phrase, “Primum non nocere.” Hippocrates
came closest to stating these words in his treatise Epidemics. See Howard Markel, “I
Swear by Apollo”—on Taking the Hippocratic Oath, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2026, 2026–
29 (2004).
41
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).
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infringement.42 This statute was passed after a patent owner tried
to enforce a patent covering a process for making a certain type of
surgical incision in the eye during cataract surgery.43 The process
patent governing a physician’s activity during surgery was
unquestionably patent eligible,44 and the policy response, after
heavy lobbying by the American Medical Association, came from
Congress in the form of the above-referenced exemption.
Congress chose not to alter the process patent eligibility rules, even
when it was presented with a perfect opportunity to do so, and we
submit that the courts should not effect such a result with respect to
diagnostic method claims, particularly in the absence of a clear
expression from Congress.
Claim 13 provides an excellent example to underscore the
important difference between the low threshold requirements for
patent eligibility under the Fundamental Principles Exception and
the much more rigorous requirements for patentability. Claim 13
defines patent eligible subject matter, but the patentability of the
subject matter may still be challenged for other reasons, for
example: obviousness, non-enablement, or claim overbreadth. The
two concepts must be separated and not confused, but confusion is
exactly what occurred when the court in Parker v. Flook45
articulated the “post-solution activity” corollary.46 In Flook, the
42

35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) defines “medical activity” as
the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but
shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a
patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.
43
Pallin v. Singer, No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365, at *1 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
44
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“We are directed to no authority for the proposition that a new and inventive process
involving ‘human activity’ has historically been treated differently from other processes;
indeed most inventions involve human activity.”), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
45
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
46
Id. at 590. In Flook, the patentee, Dale Flook, applied for a patent on a “Method for
Updating Alarm Limits.” Id. at 585. The “alarm limits” were particular numbers between
which a catalytic converter was determined to be operating normally. Id. When any of
the catalytic conversion process variables exceeded a predetermined alarm limit, the
alarm sounded. Id. Flook’s patent application described and claimed a method of
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Supreme Court held that the respondent’s process of applying a
mathematical algorithm was unpatentable:
[N]ot because it contains a mathematical algorithm
as one component, but because once that algorithm
is assumed to be within the prior art, the
application, considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention. Even though a phenomenon
of nature or mathematical formula may be well
known, an inventive application of the principle
may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such
a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there
is some other inventive concept in its application.47
While the above-quoted statements are correct, the Court
improperly conflated the threshold patent eligibility determination
with the substantive determination of patentability or “inventive
concept.” Whether the algorithm or natural phenomenon in
question is known in the prior art is irrelevant to patent eligibility,
but quite relevant to the question of patentability. This type of
claim dissection into new and old parts was forcefully condemned
by the Court in Diehr,48 precisely because it confused the threshold

updating alarm limits by utilizing a mathematical algorithm. Id. Flook’s method was
identical to previous systems for updating alarm limits except for the use of the
mathematical algorithm. Id. at 586. The Patent & Trademark Office Board of Appeals
sustained the rejection of Flook’s method claims for failing to satisfy the statutory subject
matter test under Gottschalk v. Benson. Id. at 587; Gottschalk v. Benson, 509 U.S. 63, 67
(1972). Flook appealed and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”)
reversed. Flook, 437 U.S. at 587; see also In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
The CCPA read Benson as applying only to claims that entirely preempt a mathematical
formula or algorithm, and it held the claims to be patent eligible for examination because
they recited post-solution activity and did not entirely preempt the formula or algorithm
used. Flook, 437 U.S. at 587. The patent claimed only the right to use the algorithm in
the limited context of the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. The CCPA
reasoned that since “the mere solution of the algorithm would not constitute infringement
of the claims, a patent on the method would not preempt the formula.” Id. The Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari. Id. at 588.
47
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
48
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (“It is inappropriate to dissect the
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in
the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of
steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination
were well known and in common use before the combination was made.”).
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question of patent eligibility with the substantive question of
patentability, obviousness in particular, which can only be
answered after examination of the patent application and any
subsequent administrative or litigation challenges. This confusion,
also reflected in Justice Breyer’s LabCorp dissent,49 is
understandable but dangerous because it threatens to restrict the
statutory category of process patents, contrary to black letter law
that a new combination of previously well-known process steps
may be patentable.50 Identification of “prior art” process steps and
questions of inventive concept or conventional versus nonobvious
subject matter are part of a patentability analysis;51 they play no
role in the threshold determination of patent eligible statutory
subject matter.
Patent eligibility should turn solely on a
determination of whether the claim as a whole defines a
fundamental principle and whether it preempts all uses and
implementations of that principle.
2. Machine-or-Transformation Analysis
Viewing LabCorp claim 13 through the prism of Bilski’s
machine-or-transformation test, rather than the Fundamental
Principles Exception, adds confusion and complexity. The inquiry
focuses on transformation because it is clear that the claimed
diagnostic process is not tied to any particular machine or
apparatus.
The “assaying” step in claim 13 is a necessary data-gathering
step that allows a physician or other medical practitioners to
recognize elevated homocysteine levels, which can be correlated to
a cobalamin or folate deficiency in a sick patient.52 Whether that
necessary step transforms a blood or urine sample in the process of
obtaining the data is not necessarily relevant to the question of
49

See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 137–38
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50
See id. at 136–37. The emphasis on the assay step as an “unpatented” procedure or
test in Justice Breyer’s LabCorp dissent is misplaced. The LabCorp dissent effectively
ignores and sets aside the “unpatented” assay step, rather than assessing the claimed
process as a whole as mandated by Diehr. Id. at 129.
51
See Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
52
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col. 9 ll. 30–57 (filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10,
1990).
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process patent eligibility.53 Concentrating the analysis on whether
a transformation occurs and, if so, whether that transformation
imposes “meaningful limits on the claim’s scope,” is “central to
the purpose of the claimed process,” or amounts to “insignificant
extra-solution activity” or mere data-gathering,54 misses the big
picture and detours the analysis away from the straightforward
question of whether the claim defines a practical application of the
correlation. The use of words like “meaningful,” “central,”
“insignificant,” and “mere” also add unnecessary complexity,
subjectivity, and uncertainty to the analysis. Focusing on
transformations and the significance or centrality of extra-solution
activity in determine-and-infer claims, such as claim 13, is another
way of dissecting and separating claim elements, rather than
viewing the combination of process steps as a whole to determine
what, if any, is the practical application of the process.
These considerations aside, the assay step in claim 13 is
transformational, and that transformation is necessary and central
to the claimed diagnostic process. Dependent claims 15 and 16,
for example, recite transformational chromatographic techniques to
be used to measure the homocysteine level in a bodily fluid
sample, which in turn provides the necessary data for a physician
to make the diagnostic correlation.55 Yet, one can see how
different judges could reach very different conclusions about
whether an assay step is central to a diagnostic method or nothing
more than mere data-gathering or insignificant extra-solution

53
See Collins, supra note 34, at 2 (“There is no rational reason to use the tangibility of
the transformation affected by the determining steps in a determine-and-infer claim as a
peg on which to hang patent eligibility.”).
54
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). “Each patent examination center, each trial
court, each panel of this court, will have a blank slate on which to uphold or invalidate
claims based on whether there are sufficient ‘meaningful limits,’ or whether a
transformation is adequately ‘central,’ or the ‘significance’ of process steps.” Id. at 994
(Newman, J., dissenting).
55
’658 Patent col. 42 ll. 7–18. The chromatographic techniques themselves could
even be considered special purpose machines that independently satisfy Bilski’s machineor-transformation test. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581
F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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activity that renders a claim patent ineligible.56 The multi-step
analysis required by Bilski’s transformation test engenders more
confusion and permits more opportunities for inconsistent,
subjective judgments on the question of patent eligibility as
compared to the well-settled Fundamental Principles Exception,
particularly as articulated by the Court in Diehr.57 Adhering to the
simpler and more flexible analysis of the Fundamental Principles
Exception will provide a firmer foundation for more consistent
judgments of patent eligible subject matter.
B. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen: When Transformation Is
Not Enough
Shortly after deciding Bilski and prior to Prometheus, a Federal
Circuit panel applied the machine-or-transformation test to a
different type of determine-and-infer claim that did not involve
diagnostic methods.58 In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC,59 the district court reviewed claims directed to a method for
determining a vaccine schedule used to lower the risk of chronic
immune-mediated diseases in mammals60 and granted summary
judgment for the defendant on the grounds that Classen’s patents
were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.61 The Federal Circuit then
held that the claims failed the machine-or-transformation test
without providing any analysis.62

56
This scenario is illustrated by the inconsistent decisions of the trial and appellate
courts in the Prometheus case, discussed infra Part II.C.
57
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
58
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App’x 866, 867 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
59
No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x
866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
60
Id. at *5.
61
Id. at *6.
62
Classen, 304 F. App’x at 866 (“In light of our decision in In re Bilski, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment that these claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus’ nor do
they ‘transform[ ] a particular article into a different state or thing.’ Therefore we
affirm.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 U.S.
943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct.
2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9,
2009))).
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Classen may have been correctly decided, but we do not
believe that application of the machine-or-transformation test led
the court to the correct result. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No.
5,723,283 (the “’283 patent”), the principal claim at issue in
Classen, reads:
A method of determining whether an immunization
schedule affects the incidence or severity of a
chronic immune-mediated disorder in a treatment
group of mammals, relative to a control group of
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals
in the treatment group of mammals with one or
more doses of one or more immunogens, according
to said immunization schedule, and comparing the
incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said
chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a
marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group,
with that in the control group.63
The first step in the claimed process recites “immunizing”
subjects in a treatment group of mammals; the second step recites
“comparing” therapeutic affect data from treatment and control
groups.64 In line with claim 13 in LabCorp, claim 1 of the ’283
patent plainly follows a type of determine-and-infer template but
without the specificity or particularity of LabCorp claim 13.65 The
“comparing” step here,66 as in LabCorp claim 13, is directed to a
mental activity that, under Bilski, does not qualify as
transformational.67 The “immunizing” step, however, is directed
to altering subject mammals from an initial state (i.e., susceptible
to a pathogen) into a different state (i.e., immune to a pathogen).68
63

U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 col. 51 ll. 50–60 (filed May 31, 1995) (issued Mar. 2,
1998).
64
Id.
65
Compare id. at col. 51 ll. 50–60, with U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col. 41 ll. 58–65
(filed Nov. 20, 1986) (issued July 10, 1990).
66
’283 Patent col. 51 ll. 57–60; see also Classen, 2006 WL 6161856, at *5.
67
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 965.
68
See ’283 Patent col. 51 ll. 54–56; Warren Woessner & Tania Shapiro-Barr, Federal
Circuit Applies Bilski Standard in Classen, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Mar. 2009, at 1, 4
(“The step of ‘immunizing mammals,’ as recited in the Classen claim, entails the
transformation of mammals from a nonimmune state to an immune state.”).
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As several commentators note, this sort of activity plainly qualifies
as transformational under Bilski.69 Of course, it must still be
determined whether that transformation is “central” to the claimed
process and not “insignificant extra-solution activity” or “mere
data-gathering.”70 The court in Classen apparently concluded that
the immunizing step was not central to the claimed process or
constituted mere data-gathering; otherwise it is difficult to fathom
the basis for the court’s decision. While the basis for the court’s
conclusion is not expressed, it is quite plausible that a different
court might conclude otherwise, reasoning that the preamble
language defines a particular patent eligible use and the
immunization of the treatment group is central to a method for
determining an optimal immunization schedule to prevent
immune-mediated disorders.
It is worth recalling that the Bilski majority proffered the
machine-or-transformation test as a proxy for the Fundamental
Principles Exception because the latter inquiry was “hardly
straightforward.”71
But it begs the question: What is
straightforward about determining whether a particular
transformation is central to a claimed diagnostic or treatment
optimization process; or whether it constitutes mere datagathering; or whether it constitutes insignificant extra-solution
activity? In our view, the difficulty of answering these questions is
illustrated in Classen. In contrast, the Fundamental Principles
Exception requires determining whether the claim particularizes an
application of a fundamental principle (natural law, natural
phenomenon, and/or abstract idea) so as not to preempt all uses of
that principle.72
Analyzed under the Fundamental Principles Exception, the
hallmark of claim 1 in Classen appears to be its abstractness and
lack of particularity. The claim recites the process steps of
performing a medical procedure (immunization according to an
69

See Holman, supra note 10, at 18; Woessner & Shapiro-Barr, supra note 68, at 4.
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
71
Id. at 954.
72
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 203 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
599 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972); see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at
1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
70
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undefined schedule) on individuals in an experimental treatment
group and comparing the incidence (or severity) of a class of
disorders in the treatment group to the incidence (or severity) in a
control group.73 The claimed process embodies a general
application of the scientific method to a class of chronic immunemediated disorders.74 The process is an abstract technique or
algorithm for conducting research that mandates varying the
conditions in an experimental treatment group with respect to a
control group and observing the comparative effects.75 Although
the claim is drawn to the field of vaccine scheduling studies for
chronic immune-mediated disorders, there is no particular
application claimed. Because of that lack of particularity, claim 1
constitutes an impermissible attempt to preempt the use of the
scientific method in the field of vaccine scheduling studies for
chronic immune-mediated disorders. The claim does not apply the
scientific method to prescribe or optimize a particular vaccine
schedule that entails less risk of a particular chronic immunemediated disorder in a particular subject group.76 If it did so, that
would reduce the claim’s preemptive footprint to a specific
application in the field of use. As it is, however, the claim is
drawn to a general application of the scientific method in research
involving all possible vaccination schedules vis-à-vis all possible
immune-mediated disorders in all kinds of mammals. We note that
the district court applied the Fundamental Principles Exception in
its opinion granting summary judgment of invalidity: “Although
articulated as a process, the [’]283 patent does not claim a specific
technique or technical process of testing vaccine safety. Instead,
73

’283 Patent col. 51 ll. 50–60.
See id. at cols. 51–54.
75
See id.
76
Indeed, Dr. Classen purportedly discovered
that when one or more immunogens, in a pharmaceutically acceptable
composition, is first administered at an early age (typically prior to 42
days of age), it can substantially decrease the incidence, frequency,
prevalence or severity of, or prevent, at least one chronic immune
mediated disorder, and/or a surrogate marker thereof.
Id. at col. 7 ll. 35–41. However, Claim 1 fails to recite a vaccination schedule prior to 42
days of age, instead attempting to claim the general investigative method upon which the
purported discovery was based to foreclose all other inquiries into optimal vaccination
schedules in all mammals.
74
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the [’]283 patent describes only a general inquiry of whether the
proposed correlation between an immunization schedule and the
incidence of chronic disorders exists.”77 In Classen, we submit,
application of the Fundamental Principles Exception is a more
straightforward test and yields the correct result with greater clarity
and certainty than application of the machine-or-transformation
test.
C. Patent Eligibility of the Prometheus Claims
The Prometheus case, which we also believe was correctly
decided, illustrates the difficulties inherent in the machine-ortransformation test as applied to method claims in the emerging
field of personalized medicine. Prometheus is the sole and
exclusive licensee of patents claiming methods for determining the
proper dosage of thiopurine drugs, which are used for treating both
gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal autoimmune diseases.78
These drugs include 6-mercaptopurine (“6-MP”) and azathiopurine
(“AZA”), a pro-drug that converts to 6-MP, which are used to treat
inflammatory bowel diseases (“IBD”) such as Crohn’s disease and
ulcerative colitis.79 6-MP is broken down by the body into various
6-MP metabolites, including 6-methyl-mercaptopurine (“6-MMP”)
and 6-thioguanine (“6-TG”).80 The patents involve determining
the concentration of these two metabolites in sick patients.
6-MP and AZA have been used for years to treat autoimmune
diseases, but non-responsiveness and drug toxicity may complicate
treatment in some patients.81 The patents, therefore, claim
methods that seek to optimize therapeutic efficacy while
minimizing toxic side effects. Claim 1 of the ’623 patent is
representative:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for
treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug
77
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL
6161856, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
78
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (issued Mar. 12, 2002).
79
Id. at col. 1 ll. 41–44.
80
Id. at col. 1 ll. 45–48.
81
Id.
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providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b)
determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said
subject
having
said
immune-mediated
gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount
of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine
greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood
cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said
drug subsequently administered to said subject.82
Emphasizing that the Prometheus patent contains “method of
treatment” claims, with particular emphasis on the preamble
language of “optimizing therapeutic efficacy” and “reducing
toxicity,” the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and found
the claims patent eligible.83 There was no serious dispute between
the parties that both the administration of a drug providing 6-TG
and the determination of the 6-TG level in a patient resulted in
transformations, either in the human body or in a blood sample.84
Instead, the critical issue was whether those steps constituted
insignificant extra-solution activity, mere data-gathering or
something more.85 The court, however, strained to explain its
rationale for distinguishing the administration and determining
steps from mere data-gathering steps, declaring that these steps are
“central” to the purpose of the claims because “the administering
and determining steps are part of a treatment protocol, and they are
transformative.”86 In our view, the mandatory machine-ortransformation test caused the court to strain unnecessarily to try to
fit a square peg into a round hole by arguing that the claims are
methods of treatment.87 The claims do not use traditional language
82

Id. at col. 20 ll. 10–25 (emphasis added).
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). The district court found that the administration and determining steps
amounted to mere data-gathering steps and held the claims to be patent ineligible. Id.
84
Id. at 1347.
85
Id.
86
Id. (emphasis added).
87
Id. at 1346.
83
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such as “administering a therapeutically effective amount of 6TG,” which one would expect to see in a method of treatment
claim. Moreover, as the district court pointed out below, the
“wherein” clauses do not require any actual change in dosage to
optimize the therapeutic efficacy or to reduce toxicity of the
treatment.88 It would have been simpler and more effective had the
court applied the analysis required by the Fundamental Principles
Exception.
The court articulated its most compelling argument for patent
eligibility in an insightful application of the Fundamental
Principles Exception:
[T]he claims do not preempt natural processes; they
utilize them in a series of specific steps. . . . The
inventive nature of the claimed methods stems not
from preemption of all use of these natural
processes, but from the application of a natural
phenomenon in a series of transformative steps
comprising particular methods of treatment.89
The natural phenomenon at issue is the ability of the human
body to metabolize a drug to 6-TG.90 It is not the claimed
correlation between a metabolite level generated from
administration of a synthetic drug and an optimal therapeutic or
non-toxic dose. The claimed process utilizes the naturally
occurring metabolic function to generate measurable metabolite
levels that can be compared to optimal levels for optimizing
therapeutic efficacy or reducing toxicity. The patent does not
claim the naturally occurring metabolic function itself. The
correlation defined in the wherein clauses, with specific
concentrations of 6-TG recited, is the practical application of a
treatment optimization process for a sick patient as recited in the
Like the determine-and-infer claims of
claim preamble.91
LabCorp,92 this is all that should be required for patent eligibility,
88

Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1349.
90
See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 4 ll. 60–64 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (issued Mar. 12,
2002) (stating that both 6-MP and AZA can be metabolized to 6-TG).
91
Id. at col. 2 ll. 16–18.
92
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
89
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freed from the additional restraints of Bilski’s machine-ortransformation test.
D. Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
Trademark Office: Omitting the Determination Step
Inspired by the rulings in Bilski and Classen, the plaintiffs in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
Trademark Office93 invoked § 101, inter alia, to challenge a group
of patents owned by Myriad Genetics.94 The patents cover breast
and ovarian cancer-susceptibility genes BRCA1/BRCA2, as well
as diagnostic and therapeutic screening methods utilizing those
genes.95 According to plaintiffs, certain claims in the patents
violate § 101 under the Fundamental Principles Exception because
the claims cover “products of nature, laws of nature and/or natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic human knowledge or
thought.”96 The court recently granted summary judgment of
invalidity and an appeal is pending.97
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (the “’999 patent”) is
representative of the diagnostic method claims at issue in the case:
A method for detecting a germline alteration in a
BRCA1 gene, said alteration selected from the
group consisting of the alterations set forth in
Tables 12A, 14, 18 or 19 in a human which
comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene
or BRCA1 RNA from a human sample or analyzing
a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA
from said human sample with the proviso that said
germ line alteration is not a deletion of 4

93

No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 WL 1233416 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010).
Id. at *1.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. Applying Bilski’s machine-or-transformation test, the court struck down all of
the method claims at issue in the suit. See id. at *46–50. More suprisingly, the court also
invalidated the composition claims covering isolated DNA corresponding to the
BRCA1/BRCA 2 genes as “not markedly different” than products of nature. See id. at
*41–46.
94
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nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 41844187 of SEQ ID NO: 1.98
Strikingly, and unlike the claims in LabCorp, Classen or
Prometheus, this claim recites only an “analyzing” step without
further limitation. Although there is no doubt that extensive
handling and manipulation of genetic material needs to be
performed prior to the claimed “analyzing” step, and that such
activity would likely satisfy Bilski’s transformation test, those
implicit manipulations are not recited as part of the claimed
process. In other words, the claim departs from the determine-andinfer template by omitting altogether the “determine” step. The
court characterizes claim 1 of the ’999 patent as follows: “[w]hile
the purpose of the claimed method is, for example, to ‘detect a
germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene,’ the method actually
claimed is ‘analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene.”’99
Because claim 1 of the ’999 patent, as a whole, is directed to a
purely mental process, the claimed process should not withstand
scrutiny under the Fundamental Principles Exception.100 The claim
also fails the machine-or-transformation test. The “analyzing” step
is not tied to a particular machine nor does it transform a particular
article into a different state or thing. There is no claimed assay or
“determining” step to determine the sequence of a BRCA1 gene in
a human sample, although such a step is implicit in the claim. The
claim does not require the physical transformation of a tissue
sample or any other physical transformation.
Therefore,
98

U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 col. 161 ll. 17–25 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Jan. 20,
1998) (emphasis added).
99
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 WL 1233416, at *48 (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in original) (citing ’999 Patent col. 161 ll. 17–18, 20–21).
100
In Bilski, the majority characterized the “hedging” claim at issue as directed to a
“purely mental process of performing requisite mathematical calculations without the aid
of a computer or any other device” followed by an insignificant post-solution step. In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL
3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009). Quoting In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), which
struck down claims directed to a process for arbitrating a particular kind of commercial
dispute, the majority observed that “claims to such an ‘application of [only] human
intelligence to the solution of practical problems’ is no more than a claim to a
fundamental principle.” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 965 (alteration in original) (quoting Comiskey,
499 F.3d at 1379).
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application of the machine-or-transformation test should not save
this claim under § 101.
In contrast, claim 20 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (the “’282
patent”) does not omit the “determine” step in the determine-andinfer template and therefore requires a closer analysis under § 101.
Claim 20 recites:
A method for screening potential cancer
therapeutics which comprises: growing a
transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an
altered BRCA1 gene causing cancer in the presence
of a compound suspected of being a cancer
therapeutic, growing said transformed eukaryotic
host cell in the absence of said compound,
determining the rate of growth of said host cell in
the presence of said compound and the rate of
growth of said host cell in the absence of said
compound and comparing the growth rate of said
host cells, wherein a slower rate of growth of said
host cell in the presence of said compound is
indicative of a cancer therapeutic.101
Unlike claim 1 of the ’999 patent, this claim is not directed
solely to a mental process or a naturally occurring phenomenon.
The first two steps require “growing” a particular type of cell in the
presence or absence of a suspected cancer therapeutic; the last two
steps require the mental steps of “determining” and “comparing”
growth rates.102 This claim’s structure leads to the question of
whether it is closer to the claim in Classen or the claim in
Prometheus.103
In our view, claim 20 in the ’282 patent is a practical
application of screening potential therapies for the types of breast
101

U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 col. 156 ll. 15–27 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued May 5,
1998) (emphasis added).
102
Id.
103
The district court has concluded the former, disparaging the recited transformative
steps as “nothing more than preparatory, data-gathering steps to obtain growth rate
information” and stating that the transformative steps “do not render the claimed mental
process patentable under § 101.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 WL 1233416, at
*50.
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and ovarian cancers attributable to the altered BRCA1 gene.104
The growth rates of transformed eukaryotic host cells are not
natural phenomena, they are process steps required for trying to
identify potential compounds that can treat particular diseases.105
The process may be obvious or imperfectly enabled, but it should
not be deemed patent ineligbile.
Like Classen, the claim limits application of the principle to a
field of use, which is cancer therapeutics.106 Unlike Classen,
however, the claim does not attempt to preempt all uses of the
principle in that field of use, but is instead limited to a specific
application involving particular gene sequences responsible for
causing particular types of cancer.107 As the majority in Bilski
acknowledged, the Fundamental Principles Exception is essentially
an inquiry into the scope of the exclusion effected by the claim.108
Here claim 20 of the ’282 patent is drawn to a specific application
of the scientific method to screen potential cancer therapeutics
with respect to a particular gene sequence. The claim does not
preempt all uses of the principle in all fields or even in the single
field of cancer therapeutics.
Application of the machine-or-transformation test would be
less straightforward and could possibly lead to a different
conclusion, unfairly restricting patent eligibility for claim 20 of the
’282 patent and other claims of its ilk (as illustrated by the district
court decision). The claimed screening process is not tied to a
particular machine or apparatus.109 Thus, the issue is whether the
104

See ’282 Patent col. 156 ll. 15–27.
Id.
106
See id. at col. 1 ll. 19–23.
107
Id. at col. 1 ll. 24–40.
108
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), argued sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964,
2009 WL 3750776 (Nov. 9, 2009).
109
The Bilski test requires the claimed process to be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus. While it has been argued that this “tying” requirement should not be limited
only to machines but include other categories of statutory subject matter such as
compositions of matter, see Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581
F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“In addition, Prometheus contends that Bilski’s use of
‘machine’ in its machine-or-transformation test must be read as shorthand for all
patentable subject matter, including compositions of matter.”), the Court has not
expressly ruled on that issue. If the tying requirement allows for tying the claimed
105
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“growing” steps are transformational and, if so, whether the
transformation is central to the claimed process or insignificant
extra-solution activity.110 The “growing” steps essentially require
an in vitro experiment whereby eukaryotic cells containing the
BRCA1 gene are cultured in the presence and absence of a
suspected cancer therapeutic agent.111 This kind of activity
qualifies as a transformation under Bilski, particularly in view of
Prometheus, because it involves altering a particular article (a
eukaryotic cell containing a BRCA1 gene) from an initial state (a
single or few cells) to a different state (a larger population of
cells).112 However, some could argue that cells naturally divide
(“grow”) without any human intervention and the essentially
passive act of providing a proper artificial medium and conditions
to allow them to do so in vitro is akin to watering a plant in the
presence of adequate sunlight. If it is at all doubtful that the latter
activity is transformational, then it is doubtful the former activity is
too. In any event, the outcome of a machine-or-transformation
analysis of claim 20 of the ’282 patent appears to be more
uncertain than under the Fundamental Principles Exception and
could unfairly exclude this important screening method advance
from the category of patent eligible subject matter under § 101.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing claims analysis demonstrates that the machineor-transformation test of Bilski is not particularly well-suited to
assessing the types of diagnostic and genetic screening methods
that are increasingly utilized in the area of personalized medicine.
Under that test, it is plausible that a claim such as LabCorp’s claim
13 could be excluded as patent ineligible even though application
process to a particular composition of matter, then claim 1 of the ’282 patent more easily
meets the test. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
110
At first blush, the use of the word “transformed” in the claim may lead some
immediately to assume that some kind of transformation is involved in the “growing”
steps of the claimed process, but that would be a mistake. In the context of the claim, the
process of transforming a eukaryotic cell with an altered BRCA1 gene is not recited as a
step in the claim. The question whether a transformation occurs as part of a claimed
process must be determined only with respect to the recited steps.
111
’282 Patent col. 1 l. 61–col. 26 l. 5.
112
Id. at col. 156 ll. 15–23.
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of the Fundamental Principles Exception should lead to the
opposite conclusion. The claims at issue in Prometheus and claim
20 of the ’282 patent in the Myriad Genetics case reflect similar
uncertainties. Conversely, applying the machine-or-transformation
test to a claim such as Classen’s, it is plausible that a court could
find patent eligibility, even though we believe application of the
Fundamental Principles Exception should dictate otherwise. The
uncertainty principally lies in assessing whether a particular
transformation satisfies the “insignificant extra-solution activity”
corollary of the machine-or-transformation test. In our view,
Bilski’s transformation analysis focuses on the wrong question for
diagnostic and screening methods and unnecessarily complicates
what should be a straightforward assessment of whether patent
eligible subject matter is entitled to be examined for compliance
with the requirements for patentability. To avoid this kind of
uncertainty, especially in the increasingly important areas of
medical diagnostics and personalized medicine, the Supreme Court
should reemphasize the primacy of the well-settled Fundamental
Principles Exception standard for determining patent eligibility of
process claims and reject the mandatory, exclusive applicability of
the machine-or-transformation test.

